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Monetary sanctions are an integral and increasingly debated feature of the American criminal legal system.
Emerging research, including that featured in this volume, offers important insight into the law governing
monetary sanctions, how they are levied, and how their imposition affects inequality. Monetary sanctions
are assessed for a wide range of contacts with the criminal legal system ranging from felony convictions to
alleged traffic violations with important variability in law and practice across states. These differences allow
for the identification of features of law, policy, and practice that differentially shape access to justice and
equality before the law. Common practices undermine individuals’ rights and fuel inequality in the effects of
unpaid monetary sanctions. These observations lead us to offer a number of specific recommendations to
improve the administration of justice, mitigate some of the most harmful effects of monetary sanctions, and
advance future research.
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“[T]he moderate reform would be make it fair.
The better reform would be get rid of it.”
—California Attorney

Monetary sanctions are an integral and increasingly debated feature of the American criminal
legal system. Tens of millions of people each
year are assessed fines, fees, and other costs
stemming from legal involvement triggered by
traffic stops to felony convictions. Policing
agencies, criminal courts, and probation and
parole agencies often assess monetary sanctions and, along with private collection agencies in some states, collect them. The widespread use of monetary sanctions as a form of
punishment for criminal offenses has generated billions of dollars in revenue while generating a massive amount of debt among those
unable to pay.
Monetary sanctions are often characterized
as a less punitive sanction than other forms of
punishment, such as incarceration (Greene
1988; Morris and Tonry 1991; Petersilia 1999;
Tonry and Lynch 1996). Nora Demleitner (2005)
argues that monetary sanctions are an integral
part of community reintegration for people involved in the criminal legal system, writing that
they: “allow—and even require—individuals to
be employed, pay fines and make restitution,
pay taxes, and assist their families. Such demands are crucial to allowing them to regain
their place in society” (Demleitner 2005, 346).
Jurisdictions across the United States rely on
revenue from monetary sanctions to fund a
wide variety of justice and non–justice related
purposes, including courts and other government operations (Sances and You 2017; Martin
2018; Pacewicz and Robinson 2020).
Research shows, however, that large numbers of people are unable to pay their fines and
fees, and courts may be paying more in attempts to collect or sanction nonpayment than
they will ever generate as revenue (Menendez
et al. 2019). Some 6 percent of adults in the
United States report debt from court costs or
legal fees, and that number rises to 20 percent
of people with an immediate family member in
jail or prison (Federal Reserve 2020). At the
state level, a recent analysis finds that total
court debt is at least $27.6 billion. Importantly,
this analysis draws on data only from the

twenty-five states that could provide at least
partial data about the amounts owed (Hammons 2021). In just three states, the amount of
outstanding debt increased by $1.9 billion between 2012 and 2018 (Menendez et al. 2019). At
the federal level, $100 billion of unpaid restitution has been deemed uncollectible due to defendants’ inability to pay (GAO 2018).
Monetary sanctions centralize money as a
key determinant of just outcomes, including
proportionality, finality, and specificity in punishment. Existing patterns of economic inequality in the United States, including racial
disparities in income and wealth, draw attention to how monetary sanctions undermine the
premise of equality before the law. Monetary
sanctions allow people with financial means to
resolve debts, fulfill sentences, and thereby absolve themselves of criminal wrongdoing. At
the same time, unpaid monetary sanctions contribute to extended system involvement and legal entanglements (Martin, Spencer-Suarez,
and Kirk 2022, this volume) that uniquely disadvantage certain subgroups of the population
on the basis of ability to pay (Bing, Pettit, and
Slavinski 2022, this volume; Sanchez et al. 2022,
this volume; Stewart et al. 2022, this volume;
Sykes et al. 2022, this volume; Harris 2016; DOJ
2015). The Ferguson Commission report concluded that legal financial obligations were exploitative and “disproportionately harmed defendants with low incomes” (Ferguson
Commission 2015, 93).
In this article, we consider how features of
law, policy, and practice across states, and
within them, shape just outcomes and equality
before the law. Emerging research, including
that featured in this double issue, offers important insight into the law governing monetary
sanctions, how monetary sanctions are levied,
and how their imposition concentrates their
negative impacts especially among low-income
individuals and people of color. We compare
the policies and practices across and within
eight states, drawing attention to variability in
monetary sanctions. This variability helps illustrate how monetary sanctions shape legal
outcomes and their consequences. The design
of monetary sanctions and common practices
undermine individuals’ rights and fuel inequality in the effects of penal debt. These observa-
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Table 1. Number and Rate of Adults Under Correctional Supervision, Study States, 2014

State

Adults on
Probation or
Parole

California
Georgia
Illinois
Minnesota
Missouri
New York
Texas
Washington
Sampled states total/average
U.S. total/average

382,600
491,800
151,800
104,300
65,800
149,100
496,900
104,000
1,946,300
4,708,100

Community
Supervision
Rate
1,280
6,430
1,530
2,490
1,400
960
2,480
1,890
2,308
1,910

Adults in
Prison or
Local Jail
207,100
91,000
67,200
16,200
43,700
77,500
219,100
30,900
752,700
2,188,000

Incarceration
Rate
690
1,190
680
390
930
500
1,090
560
754
890

Source: Authors’ tabulation based on Kaeble et al. 2016.
Note: Rates per hundred thousand adult residents.

tions lead us to offer a number of specific recommendations to mitigate some of the most
harmful effects of monetary sanctions and advance future research.
H ow M o n e ta ry S a n c t i o n s
T h wa r t J u s t O u tc o m e s

Equality under the law is axiomatic to the U.S.
criminal legal system. Although social and economic characteristics should not determine
justice outcomes, ample evidence reveals how
factors such as race, gender, and wealth can
substantially affect whether and how people
come into contact with the criminal legal system and the impact of that contact on people’s
lives (Miethe and Moore 1985; Shannon et al.
2017). In the United States, the connections between race, poverty, criminalized behavior, and
punishment are intractable (Wacquant 2009)
just as the connections between race, poverty,
and policing are well established (Miller 2008;
Stuart 2016). Because they directly bear on
wealth, monetary sanctions reify and exacerbate racial inequalities in the criminal legal system while undermining equality before the law
and fairness in outcomes.
Unequal Exposure

Exactly how and how many people are brought
into the criminal legal system varies dramatically across states and provides leverage to understand how monetary sanctions influence

fairness in case outcomes. Throughout this article, we summarize and consider implications
from an eight-state study of monetary sanctions
(for methods and aims, see Harris, Pattillo, and
Sykes 2022, this volume). Table 1 shows that
fully one-third (34 percent) of adults incarcerated in prisons and jails and more than two-
fifths (41 percent) of adults under community-
based supervision in the United States were in
these eight states in 2014. California, Illinois,
Minnesota, New York, and Washington had incarceration rates below the U.S. average; Georgia, Missouri, and Texas had rates above it.
Whereas roughly one in 256 adults in Minnesota was incarcerated in 2014, Georgia incarcerated roughly one in eighty-four.
Table 1 further shows variability in exposure
to probation and parole. In Missouri, 65,800
adults were under the supervision of probation
and parole agencies, also termed community
supervision, relative to nearly a half a million
in both Georgia and Texas. The rate of community supervision was lowest in New York, where
960 per hundred thousand were on probation
or parole, and highest in Georgia, where 6,430
per hundred thousand—more than 6 percent
of the adult population—were under the surveillance of probation and parole agencies.
Three of the states (Georgia, Minnesota, and
Texas) had parole and probation rates above
the U.S. average. Five had rates below the average.
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Traffic stops and other misdemeanors that
do not involve jail time are the modal form of
criminal legal contact (Natapoff 2018). Annually, tens of millions of people are pulled over
by police in traffic stops; approximately half of
them receive a citation (Langton and Durose
2013). Those citations commonly involve fines,
fees, and other monetary sanctions (see also
Huebner and Giuffre 2022, this volume). In
states where traffic tickets are classified as
criminal offenses, such as Georgia, Missouri,
and Texas, an unpaid ticket can further expose
people to additional criminal legal sanctions.
Even in states where traffic violations are not
classified in criminal law, unpaid tickets can
incur a wide range of civil penalties. Unpaid
criminal legal debt can precipitate police contact because courts issue warrants for failure to
pay or issue capias pro fine warrants for failure
to appear in court to address outstanding obligations (Natapoff 2018).
Although the number of people entering
America’s prisons and jails has declined in recent years (Carson 2020), the number of people
subject to legal fines and fees has grown. Estimates suggest that 66 percent of incarcerated
people have been sentenced to pay some
amount of money to the courts or other criminal legal agencies, up from 25 percent in 1991
(Harris, Evans, and Beckett 2010, 1769). Millions
more people are assessed fines and fees for traffic tickets and other misdemeanors that do not
involve jail time (Mayson and Stevenson 2020;
Natapoff 2018), though these penalties may
lead to further entanglements in the criminal
legal system (Huebner and Shannon 2022, this
volume). The revenue incentive of monetary
sanctions plays a role in some traffic stops
(Brett 2020). The Department of Justice investigation of the Ferguson (Missouri) Police Department provides a poignant example, finding
that the city finance director wrote to both the
police chief and the city manager explicitly urging more ticket writing for city income (DOJ
2015).1

Uneven Assessment

The United States has no single coherent set
of laws, policies, or practices guiding the imposition and enforcement of legal financial obligations. Thus legal fines and fees, much like
other forms of surveillance and punishment,
differ in important ways across and within
states (Harris, Evans, and Beckett 2010; Harris
2016; Martin et al. 2018). Sarah Shannon and
her colleagues (2020) find that across the eight
states in this project, the process of punishment is highly varied across and within jurisdictions, the process is not transparent, and
that noncompliance can precipitate significant
debt and extralegal consequences. Karin Martin and her colleagues (2018) show the ubiquity
of statutes governing legal fines and fees
across states but also draw attention to differences in the extent to which state statutes mandate their imposition for felony and misdemeanor cases, provide opportunities for
waivers, and offer alternative mechanisms of
compliance.
Differences in key legal provisions governing monetary sanctions across states can help
explain variability in assessment and impact.
Table 2 shows that all states, for example, require judges or other court personnel to assess
ability to pay before making a determination of
willful noncompliance, enhancing monetary
sanctions with additional penalties, or revoking probation. Despite all states’ explicit recognition of differential ability to pay, variability
in when ability to pay is determined is significant. For example, only in Washington must
ability-to-pay legal financial obligations be considered at the time of sentencing. In other
states, such as Texas and Missouri, the burden
rests on the person sentenced to request a hearing regarding their ability to pay, which in Texas
they may only do thirty days after sentencing.
In still other states, the ability to pay may only
become relevant after people default on their
legal financial obligations, at which time the
court may need to determine whether nonpay-

1. Police chief: “unless ticket writing ramps up significantly before the end of the year, it will be hard to significantly raise collections next year. . . . Given that we are looking at a substantial sales tax short fall, it’s not an
insignificant volume.” City manager: “Court fees are anticipated to rise about 7.5%. I did ask the Chief if he
thought the PD could deliver 10% increase. He indicated they could try.”
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Table 2. Key Legal Provisions Governing Monetary Sanctions, by State

Open
Records

Gold
Standard for
Automated
Court Data

Depends on the offense
statute

No

No

No

At judge’s discretion except for
mandatory fines, fees,
surcharges

Yes

No

Illinois

No, mandatory post-conviction
hearings to explain
nonpayment, cover balances,
and requests for payment

Full waivers for “assessments”
only and must apply within
thirty days of sentencing

Yes

No

Minnesota

No

Fines can be reduced to $50
and judges can allow
community service in lieu of
the fine. Surcharges and law
library fees are not waivable

Yes

Yes

Missouri

Must be granted if requested

Allowed at judges’ discretion

Yes

No

New York

Financial Hardship Hearings
after failure to pay on time

No

Yes

No

Texas

After thirty days

Allowed at judges’ discretion

Yes

No

Washington

At sentencing

At judge’s discretion except for
mandatory fines and fees

Yes

Yes

State

Ability to Pay Hearings

Waivers

California

No, but the presentencing
report lists income/assets

Georgia

Source: Authors’ tabulation.

ment was “willful” and thus subject to additional sanctions, as in Illinois (see Fernandes,
Friedman, and Kirk 2022, this volume).
How ability to pay is determined also diverges across states. Missouri state statutes instruct courts to consider the financial resources
of a defendant when making judgments but a
formal assessment or documentation is not
required.2 Judges in Washington have the discretion to assess whether people with legal financial obligations are capable of making minimum monthly payments, but are still required
to impose the mandatory minimum assessment of $500 per felony conviction. Texas has
a clearly articulated standard for the determination of indigence for court-appointed counsel, but judges retain discretion in determining

eligibility to pay legal financial obligations (see
also Harris et al. 2017).
Statutory allowances for waiving monetary
sanctions also vary widely by state. In California, the ability to waive monetary sanctions depends on the offense statute. In three states—
Illinois, New York, and Washington—the law
does not allow for the waiver of mandatory surcharges, which are those states’ dominant form
of monetary sanctions (see Martin, Spencer-
Suarez, and Kirk 2022, this volume; Harris
2016). In other states, judicial discretion is paramount, including Georgia, Minnesota, Missouri, and Texas. Nevertheless, some statutory
limits on such waivers are in place, with some
statutes disallowing the waiver of some or all
fees (Georgia, Minnesota) and surcharges or

2. Revised Statutes of Missouri (RSMo), § 514.040.
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only allowing reduction of the fine to a certain
amount (Minnesota).
Disparate Impact

Variability in the design of monetary sanctions
across states contributes to disparate experiences with and effects of monetary sanctions.
Although legal financial obligations are routinely imposed for misdemeanor and felony
criminal legal involvement, important differences in how they are assessed, whether and to
what extent they are waived, and how collections are handled can lead to differential impact and trigger a wide range of additional
sanctions. Common practices undermine individuals’ rights and fuel inequality in the effects
of unpaid monetary sanctions. Differences in
the design and implementation of monetary
sanctions across states and within them help
reveal how the negative impact of monetary
sanctions, and thus disproportionate punishment, is concentrated among people with low
incomes and, by extension, people of color
(Bing, Pettit, and Slavinski 2022, this volume)
and people receiving public assistance (Sykes
et al. 2022, this volume). Recent work further
illustrates how the negative impacts of legal financial obligations are concentrated among
immigrants (Sanchez et al. 2022, this volume)
and Native Americans (Stewart et al. 2022, this
volume).
Unpaid monetary sanctions can prompt additional criminal legal sanctions, incur added
financial penalties and surcharges, result in the
extension or revocation of probation, and lead
to the issuance of arrest warrants which can
result in jail time (Harris 2016; Harris et al. 2017;
Huebner and Shannon 2022, this volume; Ruhland, Homes, and Petkus 2020). In some states,
unpaid legal fines and fees can also set in motion civil penalties including the revocation of
drivers’ licenses, wage or asset garnishment,
and even civil lawsuits (see Fernandes, Friedman, and Kirk 2022, this volume). Katherine
Beckett and Naomi Murakawa (2012) highlight
how legal fines and fees are found in civil and
criminal systems, and Alexes Harris (2016) illustrates the powerful role court clerks, or other
administrative personnel, play in the collection
and enforcement of monetary sanctions. As a
result, as Beckett and Murakawa (2012) suggest,

legal fines and fees constitute a “shadow carceral state,” obscured in studies of conventional sentencing and sanctioning processes
yet with wide-ranging and enduring effects.
Table 3 displays how driving on a suspended
license can produce a disparate impact for people of varying economic means within each
state. Specifically, the amount due at sentencing can vary from a low of $62 in Texas to a high
of $3,480 in California. In Minnesota, a state
with a low incarceration rate (see table 1), has
financial penalties for traffic offenses that can
cost several hundreds of dollars. Variation also
exists across states in the length of time it
would take to pay off fines and fees for the
same charge. Assuming a payment plan of $50
per month, it would take considerable time
to pay off debt associated with driving on a
suspended license in some states. For instance,
in only four—Minnesota, Missouri, New York,
and Texas—would it take fewer than eighteen
months to pay off associated fines and fees.
Table 3 also reveals how fees, surcharges,
and other additional costs, including interest,
penalties, and administrative costs, can dramatically increase the total monetary sanctions
owed. In California and Washington, the maximum fine is less than half of the maximum
total assessment for driving on a suspended license. In only two states, Missouri and New
York, do fines constitute more than three-
quarters of the maximum allowed assessment.
People with financial means may pay off monetary sanctions on time and without penalty;
yet people without such means face additional
costs that may extend criminal legal system involvement as well as force hard decisions on
whether to pay.
Monetary sanctions amplify the disparities
in criminal legal system contact along the lines
of race and wealth. Recent estimates show that
the median wealth of white families is around
$190,000, of African American families slightly
more than $24,000, and of Latinx families about
$36,100 (Federal Reserve 2020). The amount
available in liquid savings also differs significantly by race. Whereas the typical Black or
Latinx family has less than $2,000, the typical
white family has more than $8,000 (Federal Reserve 2020). At the same time, African Americans are more likely than white Americans to
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$300–$1,000

$500–$1,000

$0–$2,500

$200

$150–$500

$200–$500

$0–$500

$0–$1,000

California

Georgia

Illinois

Minnesota

Missouri

New York

Texas

Washington

$200

$62.10

$50

$12,
incarceration
costs

$3–$13

$310,
incarceration
costs

$0

$4, incarceration
costs

Fees

$250

$0–$300

$83

$19.50–$44.50

$75

$85–$1,022.50

$405–$805

$60–200

Surcharges

Source: Authors’ tabulation based on Harris et al. 2017.
Note: NA, not available.

Fine

State

$100 annual

$25

NA

$25

$0

NA

NA

12% interest,
$946–$2,276

Added Charges

$450–$1,450

$62.10–$862.10

$333–$633

$206.50–$582.50

$279.50–$289.50

$395–$3,832.50

$905–$1,805

$1,310–$3,480

Amount due
at Sentencing

Table 3. Legal Financial Obligations and Time to Full Payment for Driving with a Suspended License

$686.85–$2,222.88

$87.10–$887.10

$333–$633

$206.50–$582.50

$279.50–$289.50

$395–$3,832.50

$905–$1,805

$1,310–$5,983

Total Paid,
$50 Monthly,
On-Time Payments

14–45

2–18

7–13

5–12

6

8–77

19–37

31–120

Months
Until
Paid

45.0%

56.4%

79.0%

85.8%

69.0%

65.2%

55.4%

16.7%

Percentage of
Fine to Total Bill
(Maximums)
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be arrested and convicted and African American adults are 5.9 times as likely and Latinx
adults are 3.1 times as likely to be incarcerated
than white adults (Carson 2020). Considering
these factors together, along with the ubiquity
of monetary sanctions for every offense and at
every level of government, reveals the significant potential of criminal legal debt to worsen
problematic disparities.
Li v e d E x p e r i e n c e s w i t h
M o n e ta ry S a n c t i o n s

How the design and practice of monetary sanctions shape fairness in outcomes and equality
before the law is further evident in ethnographic observations in courtrooms and interviews with people assessed monetary sanctions, attorneys, judges, and other people
tasked with enforcing them. Our research
shows how the lack of a single coherent set of
laws, policies, or practices guiding the imposition and enforcement of monetary sanctions
generates significant variability in experiences
with and effects of monetary sanctions across
states and within them. Legal financial obligations are routinely imposed for misdemeanor
and felony criminal legal involvement across
all eight states, yet important variations are evident in exposure to monetary sanctions and
states’ reliance on revenue generated from
monetary sanctions.3
How monetary sanctions are assessed,
whether and to what extent they are waived,
and how collections are handled have important consequences for people’s experiences
with the criminal legal system. People who are
assessed monetary sanctions and cannot pay
them often experience the penal debt harshly,
undermining conceptualizations of monetary
sanctions as humanizing or an intermediate
sanction (Greene 1988; Morris and Tonry 1991;
Petersilia 1999; Tonry and Lynch 1996). In the
following section, we highlight several dimensions along which fairness in outcomes and
equality before the law are compromised in
practice, as shown through the lived experiences of the people we interviewed and courtrooms we observed.

Unequal Punishment

Individuals who have the means to comply with
monetary sanctions are, for many offenses,
able to pay fines, fees, and other monetary
sanctions with the court clerk in person, online, or by mail and therefore have no further
involvement with the court (see Bing, Pettit,
and Slavinski 2022, this volume). If someone is
unable to pay, or needs accommodations, the
process can become complicated and lead to
additional sanctions. Failure to pay, comply
with the payment schedule, or to attend court
dates can lead to additional legal, financial, and
civil consequences. For those who are not able
to pay, the process of compliance with the law
is difficult (Martin, Spencer-Suarez, and Kirk
2022, this volume). The sheer variability in processes across states and within them is remarkable. Several study participants reported that
they were issued a warrant for failure to appear
at a court date when they had not received documentation of the court date.
Being unable to pay monetary sanctions can
incur a wide range of “poverty penalties,” which
add costs, measured in time or money, simply
as a consequence of needing more money or
additional time to pay. For example, in Missouri, individuals who do not have the means
to comply with a financial sanction or who
would like to contest the associated charge are
required to attend court for a hearing. Several
study participants reported negotiating payment plans with the court so that they could
spread the payment out over time. Some courts
allowed individuals to make their scheduled
payment online with a fee or with the clerk, if
the payment was made in advance of the next
payment. One study participant reported that
she had to pay to get a payment plan developed
and then had to pay an additional fee for the
show cause hearing: “Just to get any of the
judge’s time, for whatever it might be, you have
to pay them $22.50. If you can’t pay, then you
have to go in front of the judge, where you have
to pay anyway.” Several participants reported
having to make multiple trips to the courthouse
to set up a payment plan and to submit payment, and some courts levied fees for each

3. For details on revenues generated by fines, fees, and forfeitures, see table A1.
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hearing (see Huebner and Giuffre 2022, this volume).
In other courts, individuals were required to
attend a payment docket to check in with the
judge and submit payment. A similar process
is used in New York, where all courts have a
regularly scheduled financial hardship hearing
or full-time courtrooms dedicated to hearing
payment issues. Illinois described this process
as pay or appear, judges using discretion during
the hearing to decide whether the person’s nonpayment is willful. The challenges of staying up
to date with payment becomes even more difficult the longer a person is on a payment plan
or if they move.
Court observations reveal that individuals
were rarely put on warrant status because of
failure to pay, but if individuals did not attend
court they were at risk of a warrant for failure
to appear. In Texas courtrooms, we observed
judges routinely issuing capias pro fine warrants for failure to appear without any determination of ability to pay or willfulness. Field
notes from one municipal court document the
determinations: “The judge . . . begins going
down the list [of cases on the docket] rapid
fire. . . . everyone who showed up to see the
clerk [has] their charges dismissed and everyone who didn’t [show up] gets issued a warrant
for failure to appear. ‘You gotta be here to win,’
[the judge] jokes as he stamps and signs the
papers.” Another set of field notes documents
a judge issuing thirteen capias pro fine warrants for failure to appear in less than half an
hour.4
We observed similar processes in California,
Missouri, and New York. In California, for example, the court presumes that people have adequate transportation to the court, a key barrier
for many study participants; however, these assumptions matter for whether someone misses
court and has a failure to appear warrant issued. Warrants were regularly ordered for peo-
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ple who missed court in California, and many
study participants had to travel over an hour in
heavy traffic using public transportation to attend. In Missouri, if individuals were unable to
attend court because they were incarcerated, a
warrant was still issued because no central data
system tracks incarceration.
Many study participants reported that they
did not have the information they needed to
successfully navigate the criminal legal system
and manage their monetary sanctions. This
lack of information and related lack of transparency of criminal legal processes is aggravated
by poor, or proprietary, data management systems. For example, in Missouri the state maintains one data system for state courts that includes information on sentencing but often
little information on the nature of the outstanding debt. In addition, most costs are assessed at the municipal court level and each
court maintains its own system. During court
observations, we rarely observed people reminded of the requirement to opt-in to the state
court reminder system, and even more rarely
observed people opting in. Thus individuals
sentenced to debt often relied on contacting
the courts directly to get information, but the
court was rarely open, an issue of particular
concern for smaller municipal courts.
The challenge of compliance with payment
requirements was even more difficult for people who owed money in multiple jurisdictions.
A participant in Missouri owed money in several courts. When asked whether he knew how
to find out how much he owed, he said, “No. I
don’t know. I know if you probably just call
down there and they tell you what all you owe
or whatever. If you got a lot of different municipalities, you gonna have to call a lot of different
places, and you might call down to up there, up
the street to the court building and somebody
might hang up on you, have you on hold for
twenty minutes, and then they answer the

4. Data from court records in Texas show that these are not isolated cases and indigency waivers are rarely
granted for minor misdemeanors (Class C) and that arrest warrants and satisfying fines and fees through time
served is common. At the county level, fewer than 1 percent of misdemeanor cases are granted an indigency
waiver, a particularly surprising finding in a state with a poverty rate well above the national average. An equally
small proportion of cases have collections waived. At the same time, on average across counties 8.8 percent of
cases are satisfied by jail credit and nearly half (47.2 percent) of cases in one county are satisfied by spending
time in jail (see also Pattillo and Kirk 2021).
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phone and hang up. So you gotta call back and
do it all over again.”
Even people who are trying to satisfy monetary sanctions often encounter unarticulated
and unanticipated costs associated with compliance. Online payment vendors across Illinois
include an undisclosed vendor fee. These include but are not limited to convenience fees
charged by Judici E-pay. Illinois state law allows
counties to charge up to a $5 fee for payments
made by credit card or through a third-party
vendor.5 After the Ferguson Commission hearings and report, municipalities in Missouri
were required to develop websites that allow for
online payment. However, like in other states,
the online payment systems come with an additional service fee, further adding to the cost
of compliance.
The wide range of civil and criminal penalties triggered by failure to pay monetary sanctions can also result in a cascade of additional
costs. Driver’s license suspension, revocation,
or denial of renewal can be costly. Across the
states, the cost for applications to reinstate
driver’s licenses ranged from $30 (Minnesota)
to $150 (Washington), many requiring full payment of outstanding fines and fees before reinstatement (Illinois).6 In Missouri, the state allows additional fees ranging from $20 to $150.
In Texas, people are required to pay a $30 fee
before reinstatement. In New York, “termination of suspension” fees range from $50 to $100.
Although the law on the relationship between
unpaid monetary sanctions and the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) or DMV equivalent is rapidly changing in response to legal
challenges,7 many people we interviewed detailed the hardships they experienced when
outstanding legal debt prohibited them from
having, or renewing, a driver’s license.

Multiple system involvement—such as having child-support obligations in addition to
criminal legal debt—can further complicate
system involvement and incur additional costs.
Several people we spoke with were jailed for
failure to pay either child support or criminal
monetary sanctions. The degree to which criminal courts and child welfare agencies prioritize
who should be paid first is a thorny issue, but
the consequences for nonpayment in either system may compound legal entanglements. In
one notable exchange from a Georgia, a participant summarized their experience that led
to losing their driver’s license because they
owed child support:
I mean they just send you a letter saying
that. . . . Well one thing I didn’t know was
that, I thought it was something they would
automatically take care of with me being incarcerated, my child support was still going.
Of course, I’m falling behind and I’m not
knowing it. Honestly, I’m thinking if I’m
locked up it would stop because you know I
can’t pay if I’m locked up. But I didn’t know
this about two or three different times and I
fell so far behind. I get a letter your license is
suspended for child support.

The participant thought that he would have the
costs covered or paused while in prison and
went on to say that it took twenty years to eventually get his license reinstated.
Garnishment of commissary accounts in
prison and wages from work release also
emerged as a concern. Study participants from
California, New York, and Missouri, states notable for their generous allowances for garnishing commissary accounts, experienced significant material hardship—going without food or

5. Illinois Clerks of Courts Act, 705 ILCS 105/27.3 (2019), https://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/documents/0705
01050K27.3.htm (accessed August 12, 2021).
6. Minnesota, “Resolve Canceled License,” https://dps.mn.gov/divisions/dvs/Pages/search-dvs.aspx?filter1
=Driver%27s%20License&filter2=Class%20A%20-%20Commercial%20Driver&filter3 = Resolve%20
Canceled%20License (accessed August 12, 2021); Washington, “Types of Suspensions,” https://www.dol.wa
.gov/driverslicense/suspensions.html (accessed August 12, 2021); and Illinois, “Driver’s License Reinstatement
Fees,” https://www.cyberdriveillinois.com/departments/drivers/drivers_license/dlreinstatement.html (accessed
August 12, 2021).
7. On debt-based driver’s license suspensions, see Free to Drive, “Resources,” https://www.freetodrive.org
/resources/#page-content (accessed August 12, 2021).
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personal hygiene products—because their
commissary accounts were drained to satisfy
outstanding legal debt. In Washington, study
participants were concerned about the garnishment of wages earned during work release
when they also reported having to pay fees well
in excess of their earned income in order to participate in work release. A participant from
Minnesota cited their experience with the garnishing of already low wages as a reason to be
cynical about the system: “When I went to
prison, I’m making twenty-five cents an hour,
and they took half. So, you’re only making
twelve and a half cents an hour, because they
took half. Half for gate fee, for restitution, what
else was in there, I forgot. DOC imposed some
kind of fine, some kind of surcharge, back then.
On money that was sent in, they were taxing it
10 percent or something. So, if my grandma
sent me $100 bucks, I only got $90 of it, because
they took $10.”
People unable to pay legal debt experience
an abundance of legal, social, and financial
consequences until they are able to pay in full
(see also Huebner and Shannon 2022, this volume, Harris and Smith 2022, this volume, Pattillo et al. 2022, this volume, Sanchez et al. 2022,
this volume, Boches et al. 2022, this volume;
Sykes et al. 2022, this volume). Extended legal
entanglements, including long-term supervision, was common for people we interviewed
who were assessed monetary sanctions in addition to a prison or jail term. Our research
clearly illustrates how the system of monetary
sanctions serves as an unequal and indeterminate punishment for people who are too poor
to pay in full.
Arbitrary and Excessive

The sheer variability in monetary sanctions
across states for a given violation highlights
their arbitrary nature (see table 3). Research has
also drawn attention to the excessive nature of
some monetary sanctions (see, for example,
Harris 2016; Pattillo and Kirk 2021). Recent
court rulings have concurred. Timbs v. Indiana
found that asset forfeiture may contradict the
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excessive fines clause of the Eighth Amendment.8 In the majority opinion, Justice Ginsburg wrote that monetary sanctions should “be
proportioned to the wrong” and financial penalties should “not be so large as to deprive [a
person] of his livelihood,”9 making explicit reference to Black Codes used disproportionately
to convict, fine, and “subjugate newly freed
slaves and maintain the prewar racial hierarchy” (5–6).
The arbitrariness of monetary sanctions is
exemplified by practices around ability-to-pay
hearings. Although most state statutes allow
for the waiver of at least some monetary sanctions in cases when a defendant is unable to
pay, individuals who lacked legal counsel were
often ill equipped to assert their indigence and
were rarely granted waivers. In fact, some participants reported that they were discouraged
from seeking an ability-to-pay hearing and
sometimes provided misinformation from
court personnel. When we asked James, a veteran living with physical disabilities who owed
more than $1,500 for five tickets he received in
one traffic stop, whether he has tried to get an
indigence hearing to get the fees waived, he replied, “[The clerk] told me that if I wanted to do
that, I’d have to hire my own private lawyer,
which also I don’t have enough money for. I
don’t think Legal Aid takes these cases. . . . I’m
pretty sure they don’t take traffic ticket cases.
They’d be overwhelmed if they did.”
How judges determine indigence or willful
nonpayment varies across jurisdictions. In Missouri, this discretion is commonly based on
questions about the person’s lifestyle to determine whether they are spending funds on “leisure,” such as buying cigarettes rather than paying the court. Moreover, field notes indicate
that even defendants who clearly met the state
standard for indigence by relying on Social Security Income (SSI) were routinely denied indigence waivers. Instead, they were commonly
offered a monthly payment plan ($25 per month
was standard) or the opportunity to satisfy fines
and fees through community service. In Texas,
one judge claimed that even though a defen-

8. Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019).
9. Quoting Justice Ginsburg in reference to Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257 (1989), at
271 (Timbs v. Indiana).
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dant was receiving SSI and food stamps, she
could have used her tax refund to pay her outstanding legal debt. Field notes record the exchange: “The judge asks why she didn’t pay. She
says ‘you had 30 days to pay and you didn’t pay
it.’ The judge asks the defendant again, ‘When
did you get your tax refund?’ The judge orders
[the defendant] to pay $25 every 30 days. She
tells [the defendant] that ‘you had the ability to
pay.’ ‘I’m not going to find you indigent even
though you’re on the SNAP [Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program] program and the
CHIP [Children’s Health Insurance Program]
program.’”
How monetary sanctions were collected and
to whom payments were made varied greatly
across the study sites and highlight how differential access to information and technology by
which to pay can lead to disparate impacts. In
some jurisdictions, people can pay their monetary sanctions online. In others, they must pay
in person. Being able to pay monetary sanctions
online can save people significant money, time,
and hassle. However, many jurisdictions with
online court payment systems charge people additional costs to use their credit cards and per-
payment convenience fees.10 In Illinois, only
some counties allow online payment. Cook
County—the largest county by population in Illinois and the second largest by population in
the United States—mandates that payments are
made in person. Differences in how payments
are managed have important consequences for
amounts owed as well as the amount of time
and resources people have to devote to satisfying their monetary sanctions (for a related discussion of procedural hassle in misdemeanor
courts, see Kohler-Hausmann 2018).
A fundamental challenge to compliance is
not having information about how much and
how to pay. Many people we interviewed who
owed legal debt reported that they have trouble
finding information about their cases and determining how much they owe. Defense attorneys and people who owed debt suggested that
the lack of information stems from archaic
methods courts use, such as paper records (see
also Huebner and Giuffre 2022, this volume).

New York State and several communities in Illinois did not maintain online information portals that provide information on payment,
amount due, and compliance requirements. In
New York, people are expected to keep track of
what they owe and when; no payment notifications are sent after sentencing although warrants are regularly issued for nonpayment.
In many jurisdictions, clerk’s offices handled payments whether delivered in person or
online. Yet in others, collections were handled
by probation offices or private collection agencies. Payments managed by probation set in
motion additional forms of criminal legal surveillance and the involvement of private agencies introduced profit motives for enhancing
collections (Huebner and Shannon 2022, this
volume). In all Georgia courts, the primary
mode of legal debt collection is probation or
parole supervision. Collections at the felony
level in Georgia occur through a centralized,
statewide system for collections managed by a
private company that charges a fee per transaction.
Variation was significant across states and
jurisdictions on the usage of private collections
agencies. The city of Seattle has a no-cost contract with a private collections agency. According to California and Missouri law, counties are
responsible for the collection of monetary
sanctions, though they may delegate some or
all of the collection back to the courts and
counties, and courts are allowed discretion in
their collection practices, particularly when
people are more than ten days late on a payment. In Texas, courts can use private collections agencies after sixty days of nonpayment.
At the misdemeanor level, individuals on probation in Georgia and Missouri are often subject to collections through private probation
companies that charge not only monthly supervision fees but possibly also extra fees for payments (Huebner and Shannon 2022, this volume).
Expanded System Involvement

Monetary sanctions expand system involvement for people who cannot pay them com-

10. See, for example, Seattle Municipal Court’s payment portal (https://secure8.i-doxs.net/SeattleSMC, accessed August 12, 2021).
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pletely and quickly in several ways. First, monetary sanctions are levied in a wide range of
situations from felony convictions to misdemeanor citations. In some states, they are levied in courts in addition to incarcerative sentences mandating jail or prison time, often
extending system involvement after the completion of time served (Harris 2016). Legal fines
and fees also accompany supervisory sentences
requiring community service, probation, victim
panel classes, drug and alcohol assessment and
treatment, and anger management courses
(Huebner and Shannon 2022, this volume; Harris, Smith, and Obara 2019; Pattillo and Kirk
2021). The assessment of monetary sanctions
for low-level misdemeanors, including traffic
citations, also widens the scope of criminal legal contact, involving tens of millions of people
each year (Bing, Pettit, and Slavinski 2022, this
volume; Needham et al. 2020).
The assessment of monetary sanctions in
addition to prison and jail time, probation, or
other sanctions can extend surveillance. Even
after a term of supervision is completed, people
unable to pay legal debt experience an abundance of legal, social, emotional, and financial
consequences until they are able to pay in full
(Harris and Smith 2022, this volume; Huebner
and Shannon 2022, this volume). Extended legal entanglements, including long-term supervision, were common for people we interviewed
who were assessed monetary sanctions in addition to a prison or jail term. At the same time,
the costs associated with probation and other
court-mandated programs could lead to indeterminate periods of surveillance.
At the time of sentencing, judges customarily impose the completion of programs and routine monitoring. The costs for courses for driving under the influence, anger management,
drug and alcohol treatment, domestic violence,
parenting, and antitheft classes are not systematically assessed or described at the time of sentencing. Similarly, the costs of surveillance and
routine monitoring also remain unarticulated
during the sentencing process. Many of these
services leverage private companies to collect
and to report compliance with program requirements ordered by the state, and their costs
are fully revealed to individuals only when they
seek to enroll and to complete the programs.
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Worse, some participants reported having to
restart their courses because of missed payments or unattended classes, increasing the total amount. The hidden costs of probation and
program participation can dwarf the monetary
sanctions associated with fines and fees for the
offense and, unpaid, can prolong supervision
(Huebner and Shannon 2022, this volume).
The criminalization of traffic violations in
some states, including speeding tickets, has
dramatically widened the scope and impact of
monetary sanctions (Baumgartner et al. 2018;
Bing, Pettit, and Slavinski 2022, this volume;
Huebner and Giuffre 2022, this volume). In
such states, a minor infraction can lead to insurmountable debt for those who cannot pay.
In Georgia, Missouri, and Texas, getting pulled
over for speeding is considered a criminal offense and subjects millions of people each year
to extended legal entanglements if they are unable to pay (Huebner and Giuffre 2022, this volume). Even in states where minor traffic infractions are considered civil offenses, unpaid
monetary sanctions can trigger a range of civil
penalties.
One participant recalled how one traffic
ticket triggered a cascade of others: “The first
one was from failure to control speed. Then,
after that one I had a failure to appear in court.
Then, after that it was a failure to wear a seat
belt. Then, a failure to appear to court . . . I can’t
remember each one.” Legal fines and fees can
be exceptionally difficult to resolve for people
who are working poor. Deferred car repairs,
such as a broken headlight, can trigger or exacerbate legal involvement. This participant, a
middle-aged mother of two, went on to describe how all of the moving violations were
issued in the same neighborhood while she was
driving to work. On one occasion, she was
pulled over because she had a headlight out.
She explained that at first the officer told her it
would just be a warning but after he ran her license and saw that she had a pending ticket,
he issued her another: “Once he saw that I had
prior tickets, he just gave me another, which
made it kind of extremely difficult for me to
even start a payment plan because now I have
like three $500 tickets. Mind you, I still have to
take care of my kids, I still have to pay on my
car note, I still have to do my everyday living on
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top of now having to pay like $1,500 within
three days for tickets.”
K e y P o li cy R ec o mm e n dat i o n s

As our research shows, the design and practice
guiding monetary sanctions widen the scope
of criminal legal involvement, are experienced
differently based on capacity to pay rather than
evidence of wrongdoing or determination of
culpability, and further contribute to inequality
by amplifying punishment among those least
able to pay. These observations lead us to offer
specific recommendations to improve the administration of justice. They also raise important questions about whether it is an opportune
time to consider abolishing monetary sanctions in the criminal legal system altogether.
Table 4 presents a summary of recommendations in relation to how they reduce the scope
of monetary sanctions, eliminate practices that
are arbitrary or result in excessive punishment,
enhance equity, and advance research and policymaking. We draw on insights from recent
work to consider how these recommended innovations in policy and practice can address
goals of power shifting, defunding and reinvesting, and transformation to ultimately “dismantle the uniquely oppressive components of
the law” (Clair and Woog 2022, 18–22). The table
provides an intervention or recommendation,
indicates key stakeholders, and offers examples. The table also makes note of trade-offs, or
limitations, that may be associated with a given
intervention or recommendation.
Reduce the Scope of Monetary Sanctions

Our first set of recommendations centers on
reducing the scope of monetary sanctions. Over
the past fifty years, the criminal legal system
has adopted an outsized role. The United States
continues to criminalize more infractions than
ever, many of which involve monetary sanctions (Mayson and Stevenson 2020). A first, and
very important, step in reducing the harms associated with monetary sanctions is to reduce
or eliminate monetary sanctions whenever possible. Two strategies would go a long way to reducing such harms: decriminalizing traffic offenses in those states where a simple traffic
ticket can entrap people in the criminal legal
system; and ceasing the practice of assessing

monetary sanctions in addition to custodial
sentences that require spending time in prison
or jail or supervisory sentences that mandate
supervision by parole or probation agencies.
The abolition or substantial reduction in the
use of monetary sanctions system must follow
from a fundamental change in the way in which
local courts and public services are funded. A
true abolition of monetary sanctions would require a reduction or elimination of jurisdictional reliance on funding from monetary sanctions (Pacewicz and Robinson 2020). At the
same time, we call for the elimination of the
use of private agencies for debt collection and
surveillance, an often-used tactic to minimize
costs to state and local governments. Private
companies have a perverse incentive to increase total punishment through its payment
structures, because most contracts and funding depends on long terms of supervision and
frequent violation reports (Huebner and Shannon 2022, this volume).
Eliminate Arbitrary Practices and
Excessive Monetary Sanctions

To the extent that monetary sanctions remain
a feature of the criminal legal system, our second set of recommendations targets arbitrary
practices and excessive monetary sanctions
that can be particularly harmful for people who
do not have the economic means to pay. Specific strategies include mandating evaluations
of ability to pay for all defendants at the time
of sentencing, granting waivers of all costs
(even those identified as mandatory) for people
deemed unable to pay, and eliminating garnishment processes.
Ability-to-pay determinations should be
based on a person’s current income and expenses and no mandatory fines and fees should
be levied against people without adequate or
stable income to make regular payments. Furthermore, people living solely on federal
means-based income or supplements should
not be assessed any form of monetary sanctions (see Sykes et al. 2022, this volume). The
excerpts from our field notes and interviews
highlight the lack of ability-to-pay hearings
held by judges both at the sentencing of fines
and fees and at the assessment of nonpayment
compliance hearings. Further, our research
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Evaluate the definition and guidelines
used to assess behavior constituting
“willful nonpayment.” Add evaluations
to bench card guidelines.

Eliminate arbitrary and excessive
monetary sanctions
Evaluate current and future ability to
pay at sentencing with clear
guidelines outlined on bench cards.

Reduce the scope of
monetary sanctions
Reduce or eliminate jurisdictional
reliance on funding from monetary
sanctions.
Eliminate the use of private agencies
for debt collection, surveillance, and
data management.

Intervention/
Recommendations

Table 4. Policy Innovations

WA RCW 10.101.010; “Lawful Collection of
Legal Financial Obligations: A Bench Ca rd
for Judges” by the National Center for State
Courts
Legislative and judiciary determinations of
what constitutes “willful nonpayment” are
influenced by scripts about individual
responsibility and deservingness that
criminalize poverty.

judiciary
legislators

The privatization of debt collection creates
an array of “cost points” with significant
penalties for nonpayment.

legislators

judiciary
legislators

MO SB5

Models/Resources

legislators

Key
Stakeholders

(continued)

Ongoing potential for judges to not
consider the ability to pay.

Current and future ability to pay only
applies to court-imposed costs and
people may still be sentenced to fines and
mandatory costs.

Public jurisdictions have been found to
engage in practices that mirror those of
private agencies, reproducing similar
inequalities.

Constrained political feasibility of pursuing
tax-based revenue.

Limitations

Source: Authors’ tabulation.

Enhance data transparency and access
Make data accessible and transparent
on monetary sanctions to the public,
defendants, and policymakers.
legislators
judiciary

judiciary
legislators

judiciary
legislators

Remission of monetary sanctions due
to hardship.

Decouple monetary sanctions
from other institutions
Eliminate the suspension of driver’s
licenses for unpaid costs.

judiciary
legislators

Key
Stakeholders

Grant waivers for people who are
unable to pay at sentencing rather
than postconviction.

Intervention/
Recommendations

Table 4. (continued)

Unified Judicial System of Pennsylvania;
Measures for Justice

Free to Drive Campaign
IL HB3653

2018 Criminal and Traffic Assessments Act
(CCTA), which provided waivers for court
costs for people with incomes up to 400
percent of the poverty line (IL HB 4594)
WA SB 1783 allows incarcerated individuals
to petition the court to waive interest
postrelease; WA RCW 10.101.01 defines
manifest hardship where the person is
indigent.

Models/Resources

Reform requires substantial data
infrastructure and manpower to develop,
maintain, and share data.

Potential to reduce the deterrent effect of
monetary sanctions.

CCTA waivers are a postconviction remedy;
CCTA is not retroactive; CCTA does not
cover probation fees or mandated
program fees.
A judge could convert monetary sanctions
to community services hours, but
community service has been shown to
cause life disruptions.

Limitations
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highlights the stress and strain individuals and
their families experience as a result of their inability to pay their court debt and by the related
court surveillance and collateral consequences
such as the loss of drivers’ licenses (Harris and
Smith 2022, this volume).
States such as Illinois have recently overhauled their system of court costs by recognizing fees as user costs, explicitly identifying
them as harmful to people who are indigent,
acknowledging the lack of transparency in
their imposition, and implementing reforms
accordingly. In part to address the rise in appellate cases in which defendants challenge
the fairness of specific legal fines and fees, the
Access to Justice Act created the bipartisan
Statutory Court Fee Task Force, which in 2016
released its findings and policy recommendations to the Illinois General Assembly and Illinois Supreme Court (Statutory Court Fee
Task Force 2016). The candid report exposed
the unfair, “byzantine” nature of fees as user
costs, prompting the Illinois legislature to
pass the 2018 Criminal and Traffic Assessment
Act, which, among other things, provided waivers for court costs for people with incomes up
to 400 percent of the poverty line (see Friedman and Pattillo 2019).11 Furthermore, the
availability of waivers must be clearly articulated; additionally, courtroom personnel
should receive bench cards and mandated
training on how to implement new policies
(see also Colgan 2019).
Garnishment of inmate accounts, prison
wages, and other wages is unnecessarily and
excessively punitive and can result in significant hardship for people assessed monetary
sanctions as well as their families. Our interview data show that people experience garnishment as gratuitous and harmful and report that
it undermines family relationships and motivation to work (Boches et al. 2022, this volume).
Having the support of family members and
friends is important, materially and symbolically, for people trying to survive while incarcerated and trying to reenter society after a period
of incarceration. Garnishing commissary ac-
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counts and wages from work undermines family support and work effort and can have particularly acute consequences for people who are
most disadvantaged.
Enhance Equity by Revealing All Monetary
Sanctions and Inter-Institutional Involvement

Our third set of recommendations is designed
to enhance equity to ensure that the negative
effects of monetary sanctions are not concentrated on those unable to pay. Specifically, these
include clearly articulating the full extent of
monetary sanctions at the time of sentencing
and decoupling monetary sanctions imposed
by the criminal legal system from other institutions.
Costs of surveillance, routine monitoring,
and court-mandated classes and program participation often are not articulated during the
sentencing process. Many of these services leverage private companies to collect and to report defendant compliance with program requirements ordered by the state. Their costs are
only fully revealed when people seek to enroll
and complete these programs. The costs associated with court-ordered rehabilitation programs, courses, and surveillance should be
clearly articulated at the time of sentencing.
Moreover, whether charged by public or private
entities, costs should be recorded in data collection systems. Articulating the full cost of
sanctions at the time of sentencing and the collection of more comprehensive data on these
costs have the potential to reveal disparities in
both the assessment of monetary sanctions
and assignment to diversionary programming.
Driving privileges must be decoupled from
the repayment of monetary sanctions because
the suspension and revocation of licenses for
unpaid monetary sanctions incur disproportionate punishment to those who are unable to
pay. Moreover, criminal courts should adjust
payment expectations to accommodate legal
financial obligations to noncustodial children
or mandated child-support payments. If states
prioritize and penalize legal financial obligations incurred through the criminal system

11. Illinois House Bill 4594, “Criminal and Traffic Assessment Act,” 100th General Assembly (2018), https://
www.ilga.gov/legislation/BillStatus.asp?DocNum=4594&GAID=14&DocTypeID=HB&SessionID=91&GA=100
(accessed August 12, 2021).
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over those of the family, children are unduly
punished.
Make De-Identified Data Publicly Available

Our final recommendation is to make de-
identified data about criminal legal involvement and associated monetary sanctions publicly available. Across and within states, there
is wide variability in the type, amount, and
quality of data about the imposition and collection of monetary sanctions available. Courts
and the criminal legal system operate in the
public interest. Yet the lack of data availability,
and thus the lack of transparency, about what
they do and how they do it raises pressing issues of equity and accountability. Inaccessible
data shroud the mechanics of a public institution with which millions of people interact
daily, reducing our ability to evaluate the system of monetary sanctions, including the inequities it generates, and limiting capacity for effective change. In California, for instance,
Mikaela Rabinowitz, Robert Weisberg, and Lauren Pearce report that the data gap is so extensive that these “failings affect researchers’ and
practitioners’ work in criminal justice systems
in the state and inhibit critical transparency in
the largest criminal justice system in America”
(2019, 2).12
Among the many structural constraints on
data availability is whether the state has an
open records policy. The last two columns of
table 3, for example, show that almost all of the

states in our study have an open records policy;
however, in practice, these open record policies
do not ensure access to gold standard data,
namely administrative court data on monetary
sanctions that contain detailed sentencing information including financial amounts separated by fine, fee, surcharge, interest, payment
penalties, and payment amounts along with
defendant characteristics, case characteristics,
and court characteristics. Only Minnesota and
Washington—states with comparatively small
populations and low incarceration rates—provide data that contain this level of detailed information about monetary sanctions. Other
states’ data include varying levels of information about monetary sanctions.13 California—
the state with the largest correctional population (Maruschak and Minton 2020, 11) and
number of court cases (Judicial Council of California 2020)—limits data availability to researchers, the public, and even lawmakers, who
must be granted “special data-gathering powers” by the legislature to access data in order to
make very basic policy recommendations to the
governor and legislature on criminal legal reforms (see Committee on Revision of the Penal
Code 2021, 3; for details, see Rabinowitz, Weisberg, and Pearce 2019).14
These information and data gaps are exacerbated when data collection and management
systems are outsourced to private entities, as
in several states in this study. In Georgia, for
example, misdemeanor probation is largely

12. Federally collected data also have limitations in their coverage and level of detail on monetary sanctions. In
many court data systems, for example, details about monetary sanctions were often secondary to recording the
final dispositions and information about prison time or court-ordered program participation (for more detail, see
Martin et al. 2018, 478).
13. For example, data in some jurisdictions in Georgia are available one case at a time. The California Judicial
Council’s Rules of Court prohibit the bulk distribution of automated, electronic court data. The current data
infrastructure is inadequate, and the procedures for requesting access to case and inmate data can be opaque
or prohibitive (Rabinowitz, Weisberg, and Pearce 2019). In New York, two entities collect and maintain criminal
justice data: the Office of Court Administration and the Division of Criminal Justice Services. Each purportedly
keeps monetary sanction data, but neither is able to provide comprehensive, reliable data.
14. California’s criminal justice data are compartmentalized across three agencies that shield access: the California Department of Justice, which has data on arrest records and offense disposition from the courts; the
Judicial Council of California, which has detailed court data on case processing and adjudication for all fifty-eight
counties, including fines and fees; and the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, which has
data on inmates in custody and their reentry process, including supervisory costs and the terms of their probation or parole (on probation costs, see Huebner and Shannon 2022, this volume). Each of these agencies has
different rules and regulations that limit open access to researchers, practitioners, and the public.
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performed by twenty-four private companies,
each of which maintains its own data collection
system (Huebner and Shannon 2022, this volume). Similarly, Texas has at least four private
companies that provide data management systems and staff often have limited capacity to
fulfill any request for data outside legislative
mandates (Harris et al. 2017).
Access to high-quality data is essential to
making informed decisions about the effectiveness of and inequalities generated by monetary
sanctions. For example, evaluations of who can
pay, and what amounts, depend on detailed
and publicly available records of each case that
is heard and adjudicated before a judge. In the
absence of these data, researchers and policymakers do not have enough information to create and evaluate different scenarios for payment plans tailored to people of varying
economic means. We thus argue that all states
should make available de-identified, individual-
level case data, including demographic information about defendants, charges, monetary
and nonmonetary sanctions, and detailed
amounts of fines and fees sentenced, paid, and
outstanding.
C o n c lu s i o n

What is wrong with monetary sanctions? The
system of monetary sanctions is a vast and
piecemeal system of laws, policies, and practices that monetize access to just outcomes and
undermine equality before the law. People are
assessed fines, fees, and other costs on conviction in some states and at the time of a citation
in others. Viewed as punishment for wrongdoing, a source of revenue (Pacewicz and Robinson 2020), and an opportunity to demonstrate
personal responsibility and accountability
(Harris 2016, 137), monetary sanctions have a
wide range of supporters and stakeholders. At
the same time, they have faced an increasing
amount of scrutiny and have been characterized as contributing to a “two-tiered system of
justice” (Harris 2016). People who can afford to
pay their legal debts can absolve themselves of
criminal wrongdoing, whereas those who cannot suffer additional penalties, extended legal
involvements, and dehumanization. Problems
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in the design of monetary sanctions are aggravated by problems of practice at every stage of
the criminal legal system.
Ostensibly, fines could function as an efficient and low-cost form of punishment relative
to incarceration. Similarly, fees have the potential to generate revenue to offset the costs of the
criminal legal system. A subset of those convicted of a criminal offense have the means to
pay what they owe. In our observations, however, monetary sanctions inflict disproportionate harm and prolonged entanglement on
those least able to do so. Some minimal or superficial benefit of monetary sanctions aside,
on the whole, our findings reveal far more harm
than good for those of limited means.
Our recommendations are aimed at reducing the scope of monetary sanctions, equalizing access to justice, and ensuring equality under the law. However, the system continues to
fall short and have disproportionate impacts.
Just one example is that existing law prohibits
jailing someone solely on the basis of inability
to pay legal debt, and ability-to-pay hearings
are a key feature of the system of monetary
sanctions in all of the states in our study (see
Bearden v. Georgia).15 Nonetheless, our observational and interview data show that people
are routinely jailed as a consequence of their
inability to resolve outstanding legal debt.
Many of those jail stays are triggered by capias
pro fine warrants issued when defendants fail
to appear for a status hearing regarding unpaid
fines and fees or for failure to report to a probation officer out of fear of inability to pay
(Shannon 2020). Absent a formal ability-to-pay
hearing, or determination of willful nonpayment, such incapacitations are likely unconstitutional (Hecht 2017). Thus, although it is essential to revisit the mandate that courts
consistently assess ability to pay before making any determinations of willful nonpayment
or levying additional sanctions, such gross disregard for the legal intent of Bearden and subsequent legal decisions suggests that more
careful consideration needs to be given to how
to address the problems related to monetary
sanctions.
Drawing on recent work on courts and abo-

15. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 103 S. Ct. 2064 (1983).
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litionist principles (Clair and Woog 2022), we
conclude by suggesting that any reforms to the
system of monetary sanctions should seek to
shift material power from the criminal legal
system toward affected populations, to reduce
harm caused, and to reimagine ways to account
for crimes outside the criminal legal system.
Many people who have been assessed legal debt
expressed the desire to have their monetary
sanctions based on their ability to pay and suggested future policy should permit judges to
inquire about an individual’s ability to pay before sentencing fines and fees. Study participants said they wanted to pay their monetary
sanctions but were often simply unable to manage them. A participant in Illinois described it
this way: “It depends on what was more important at the time—if I needed to keep the lights
on or if I believed it was to pay the fine. I don’t
want to go to jail; that scares me.”
It was therefore not surprising that when
asked for suggestions for reforms, study participants suggested that reforms introduce
greater flexibility in payment options and related accommodations. Study participants suggested offering the option of delaying payments
for a period of time after incarceration in order
to gain their footing, for the provision of legal
support, and for help with underlying substance use and mental health issues that inhib-

ited their ability to secure employment or hold
down a steady job. In our interviews, more than
one person who owed legal debt asked simply
that they be treated with respect. A participant
who owed fines and fees in Georgia put it this
way: “I went in there trying to do right, pay
these people. . . . I don’t see why somebody will
belittle you.”
Existing laws, policies, and practices governing monetary sanctions create and perpetuate
long-term unequal outcomes particularly for
economically marginalized and racialized communities. Conceptualizing our recommendations in relation to how they restore equity, address harm, and empower economically
marginalized and racialized communities
could guide the development of additional legal templates. Such interventions and recommendations, given that they allow policymakers to identify key stakeholders and carefully
recognize the trade-offs associated with immediate and incremental changes to the criminal
legal system, can help further advance access
to justice and equality before the law. However,
questions still remain whether a system based
on monetary sanctions can ever be just in a society with so much racial and economic inequality. These questions force us to continue
to theorize a legal system that abolishes fiscal
penalties.

Table A1. Revenue Generated by Fines and Forfeits, State Plus Local Government Revenues 2013
Total Fines and Forfeits
Revenue (in Thousands)

State
California
Georgia
Illinois
Minnesota
Missouri
New York
Texas
Washington

$2,605,676
$578,236
$773,943
$110,629
$230,089
$2,158,268
$1,596,861
$294,056

Fines and Forfeits
Revenue Per Capita
$67.98
$57.87
$60.08
$20.41
$38.07
$109.83
$60.38
$42.18

Fines and Forfeits as
Percentage of
Own-Source Revenue
0.89
1.17
0.86
0.27
0.72
1.05
1.06
0.62

Source: Authors’ tabulation based on Census Bureau 2013.
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